Abstract: Liu H, Liang Zy & Li S(2009a) proposed a creative and original point of view that the loss aversion in decision making is due to the routes of loss more than gain. But their research which is designed to support their opinion is defective: (1) The decision tasks about lifespan and freedom both involve other factors and one single decision value only; (2) The “one-route of gain vs. three-route of gain” scenarios are not mentally equal. The tasks above lead replacing explanations of their results. According to these, the purpose of this paper is to retest their view on the loss aversion in an irrelevant variables strictly controlled research. Four studies were conducted and a total of 631 undergraduate students were recruited in this research. (1)In the first study, four tasks were designed and posed to participants. The scenarios of the four tasks were the same as the task designed by Liu H, Liang Zy & Li S(2009a).But the decision values of the three were different and involved 5 years, 10 years and 50 years respectively. (2)The second study consists of two parts. The first part of the study investigated the subjects’ involvement of two decision scenarios about lifespan. The second part of the study compared the subjects’ selection on the two decision scenarios in the first part. (3) The third study also consists of two parts. The first part of the study investigated whether the subjects saw freedom gained by nature or not; the second part of the study compared the selections on four kinds of decision scenarios whose valves of freedom were different among each other. (4) The forth study consists of four decision tasks. The two tasks about the “one-route of gain vs. three-route of gain” scenario that designed by Liu H, Liang Zy & Li S(2009a) were retained; the scenario of the new tasks both were designed as “three-route of gain, two-route of loss” scenario, but they differed in decision context. One of the new tasks involves the compensation scenario; the other involves the money gambling scenario. The result reveals that: (1) “one-route of gain vs. one-route of loss” scenario likes the decision about lifespan which does not lead the aversion disappeared; (2)The decision task which involves freedom gambling would not lead the aversion disappeared too; (3) All of the results show that, the perspective of uneven routes about loss aversion is not well supported. (4) The prospect theory and the perspective of affective forecasting error can not forecast the loss aversion too.

Key words: loss aversion, the perspective of uneven routes, decision about lifespan, decision about freedom, prospect theory, perspective of affective forecasting error

摘要： 刘欢、梁竹苑 和 李纾（2009a）在证明损失规避的得失程数变化视角时所取的损益值取值范围、对安于现状偏差影响的控制以及所选取的得两程失一程和得三程失两程的决策对象这四个方面存在的缺陷。本研究通过弥补上述缺陷并设计无关变量得到更严格控制的得三程失两程的决策情景，对得失程数变化视角重新进行了检验。结果发现，寿命“得一程失一程”的属性并未导致损失规避消失；在广泛的损益值范围内以自由为对象的决策同样表现为损失规避；将自由感知为生而拥有和后天获得的人数大致相当；因而得失程数变化视角需作出重要修正，同时前景理论与情绪预测误差理论亦不可完全预测损失规避出现的条件。

关键词: 损失规避, 得失程数变化视角, 寿命决策, 自由决策, 前景理论, 情绪预测误差理论