[1] 艾炎, 胡竹菁. (2018a). 推理判断中偏差反应的加工机制: 冲突探查失败, 还是抑制失败?心理科学, 41(4), 869-875. [2] 艾炎, 胡竹菁. (2018b). 推理判断中双重加工过程的协作与转换机制. 心理科学进展, 26(10), 1794-1806. [3] 于婷婷, 殷悦, 王舒, 周淑金, 唐晓晨, 罗俊龙. (2018). 不同意识水平下认知资源对直觉优势效应的调节. 心理学报, 50(6), 583-591. [4] Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017a). Fast logic: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory. Cognition, 158, 90-109. [5] Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017b). Rise and fall of conflicting intuitions during reasoning. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, London, TX. [6] Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2019a). The intuitive greater good: Testing the corrective dual process model of moral cognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 148(10), 1782-1801. [7] Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2019b). The Smart System 1: Evidence for the intuitive nature of correct responding on the bat-and-ball problem. Thinking and Reasoning, 25(3), 257-299. [8] Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2020). Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: A critical test of the hybrid model view. Thinking and Reasoning, 26(1), 1-30. [9] Bago B., Frey D., Vidal J., Houdé O., Borst G., & De Neys W. (2018). Fast and slow thinking: Electrophysiological evidence for early conflict sensitivity. Neuropsychologia, 117, 483-490. [10] Bao W., Yu T. T., Wang Y. H., & Luo J. L. (2022). The neural pattern of intuitive and analytical processes in the subliminal environment: N2 responses on the embedded Chinese character task. Consciousness and Cognition, 97, 103260. [11] Betsch, T. (2008). The nature of intuition and its neglect in research on judgment and decision making. In H. Plessner, C. Betsch & T. Betsch (Eds.), Intuition in judgment and decision making (pp. 3-22). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [12] Boissin E., Caparos S., Raoelison M., & De Neys W. (2021). From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning. Cognition, 211, 104645. [13] De Chantal P. L., Newman I. R., Thompson V., & Markovits H. (2020). Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus. Memory and Cognition, 48(4), 655-671. [14] De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and conflict: A case for logical intuitions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(1), 28-38. [15] De Neys, W. (2014). Conflict detection, dual processes, and logical intuitions: Some clarifications. Thinking and Reasoning, 20(2), 169-187. [16] De Neys, W. (2015). Heuristic bias and conflict detection during thinking. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 62, 1-32. [17] De Neys, W. (2017). Bias, conflict, and fast logic: Towards a hybrid dual process future? In W. De Neys (Ed.), Dual process theory 2.0 (pp. 47-65). Routledge. [18] De Neys, W., & Bonnefon, J. F. (2013). The 'whys' and 'whens' of individual differences in thinking biases. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(4), 172-178. [19] De Neys, W., & Pennycook, G. (2019). Logic, fast and slow: Advances in dual-process theorizing. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 28(5), 503-509. [20] Evans, J. S. B. T. (2010). Intuition and reasoning: A dual-process perspective. Psychological Inquiry, 21(4), 313-326. [21] Evans, J. S. B. T. (2019). Reflections on reflection: The nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 25(4), 383-415. [22] Evans J. S. B. T., Ball L. J., & Brooks P. G. (1987). Attentional bias and decision order in a reasoning task. British Journal of Psychology, 78(3), 385-394. [23] Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013a). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223-241. [24] Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013b). Theory and metatheory in the study of dual processing: Reply to comments. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 263-271. [25] Frey D., Johnson E. D., & De Neys W. (2018). Individual differences in conflict detection during reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71(5), 1188-1208. [26] Ghasemi O., Handley S., & Howarth S. (2022a). The bright homunculus in our head: Individual differences in intuitive sensitivity to logical validity. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 75(3), 508-535. [27] Ghasemi O., Handley S., Howarth S., Newman I. R., & Thompson V. A. (2022b). Logical intuition is not really about logic. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 151(9), 2009-2028. [28] Gladwin, T. E., & Vink, M. (2018). Alcohol-related attentional bias variability and conflicting automatic associations. Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, 9(2), Article 2043808718779632. [29] Handley S. J., Newstead S. E., & Trippas D. (2011). Logic, beliefs, and instruction: A test of the default interventionist account of belief bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37(1), 28-43. [30] Hayes B. K., Stephens R. G., Lee M. D., Dunn J. C., Kaluve A., Choi-Christou J., & Cruz N. (2022). Always look on the bright side of logic? Testing explanations of intuitive sensitivity to logic in perceptual tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 48(11), 1598-1617. [31] Howarth S., Handley S. J., & Polito V. (2022). Uncontrolled logic: Intuitive sensitivity to logical structure in random responding. Thinking and Reasoning, 28(1), 61-96. [32] Howarth S., Handley S. J., & Walsh C. (2016). The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief-logic conflict. Memory and Cognition, 44(2), 330-349. [33] Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. [34] Kuo W. J., Sjöström T., Chen Y. P., Wang Y. H., & Huang C. Y. (2009). Intuition and deliberation: Two systems for strategizing in the brain. Science, 324(5926), 519-522. [35] Markovits H., Brisson J., & De Chantal, P. L. (2017). Logical reasoning versus information processing in the dual-strategy model of reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(1), 72-80. [36] Markovits H., De Chantal P. L., Brisson J., Dubé É., Thompson V., & Newman I. (2021). Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning. Memory and Cognition, 49(3), 532-543. [37] Mevel K., Borst G., Poirel N., Simon G., Orliac F., Etard O., & De Neys W. (2019). Developmental frontal brain activation differences in overcoming heuristic bias. Cortex, 117, 111-121. [38] Morsanyi, K., & Handley, S. J. (2012). Logic feels so good-I like it! Evidence for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38(3), 596-616. [39] Newman I. R., Gibb M., & Thompson V. A. (2017). Rule-based reasoning is fast and belief-based reasoning can be slow: Challenging current explanations of belief-bias and base-rate neglect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(7), 1154-1170. [40] Pennycook G., De Neys W., Evans J. S. B. T., Stanovich K. E., & Thompson V. A. (2018). The mythical dual-process typology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22(8), 667-668. [41] Pennycook G., Fugelsang J. A., & Koehler D. J. (2015). What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement. Cognitive Psychology, 80, 34-72. [42] Pennycook G., Trippas D., Handley S. J., & Thompson V. A. (2014). Base rates: Both neglected and intuitive. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40(2), 544-554. [43] Raoelison M., Boissin E., Borst G., & De Neys W. (2021). From slow to fast logic: The development of logical intuitions. Thinking and Reasoning, 27(4), 599-622. [44] Raoelison M., Thompson V. A., & De Neys W. (2020). The smart intuitor: Cognitive capacity predicts intuitive rather than deliberate thinking. Cognition, 204, 104381. [45] Šrol, J., & De Neys, W. (2021). Predicting individual differences in conflict detection and bias susceptibility during reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 27(1), 38-68. [46] Stanovich, K. E. (2018). Miserliness in human cognition: The interaction of detection, override and mindware. Thinking and Reasoning, 24(4), 423-444. [47] Teoh Y. Y., Yao Z. Q., Cunningham W. A., & Hutcherson C. A. (2020). Attentional priorities drive effects of time pressure on altruistic choice. Nature Communications, 11(1), 3534. [48] Thompson, V. A. (2021). Eye-tracking IQ: Cognitive capacity and strategy use on a ratio-bias task. Cognition, 208, 104523. [49] Thompson, V. A., & Johnson, S. C. (2014). Conflict, metacognition, and analytic thinking. Thinking and Reasoning, 20(2), 215-244. [50] Thompson, V. A., & Markovits, H. (2021). Reasoning strategy vs cognitive capacity as predictors of individual differences in reasoning performance. Cognition, 217, 104866. [51] Thompson V. A., Newman I. R., Campbell J. I. D., Kish-Greer C., Quartararo G., & Spock T. (2021). Reasoning = representation + process: Common ground for fuzzy trace and dual process theories. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 10(4), 532-536. [52] Thompson V. A., Pennycook G., Trippas D., & Evans, J. S. B. T. (2018). Do smart people have better intuitions? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(7), 945-961. [53] Trippas D., Handley S. J., Verde M. F., & Morsanyi K. (2016). Logic brightens my day: Evidence for implicit sensitivity to logical validity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42(9), 1448-1457. [54] Trippas D., Thompson V. A., & Handley S. J. (2017). When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias. Memory and Cognition, 45(4), 539-552. [55] Vartanian O., Beatty E. L., Smith I., Blackler K., Lam Q., Forbes S., & De Neys W. (2018). The reflective mind: Examining individual differences in susceptibility to base rate neglect with fMRI. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 30(7), 1011-1022. [56] Vartanian O., Lam T. K., Maceda E., & De Neys W. (2021). Can a fast thinker be a good thinker? The neural correlates of base-rate neglect measured using a two-response paradigm. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 38(6), 365-386. [57] Williams C. C., Kappen M., Hassall C. D., Wright B., & Krigolson O. E. (2019). Thinking theta and alpha: Mechanisms of intuitive and analytical reasoning. Neuroimage, 189, 574-580. [58] Yin Y., Yu T. T., Wang S., Zhou S. J., Tang X. C., Stupple E. J. N., & Luo J. L. (2018). Event-related potentials support a dual process account of the Embedded Chinese Character Task. Neuropsychologia, 121, 186-192. [59] Zhou X. L., Chen C. H., Zhang H. C., Chen C. S., Zhou R. L., & Dong Q. (2007). The operand-order effect in single-digit multiplication: An ERP study of Chinese adults. Neuroscience Letters, 414(1), 41-44. |